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NOTES
READ THIS NOTE OR ELSE!:
CONVICTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 875(C)
FOR RECKLESSLY MAKING A THREAT
Maria A. Brusco*
What does it mean to make a threat, and under what circumstances can a
speaker be convicted for making one? This Note examines these questions
in light of Elonis v. United States, a Supreme Court case decided in June
2015. There, the Court held that when a speaker subjectively intends a
statement be taken as a threat or knows that it will be taken as a threat, she
may be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The Court did not decide
whether a speaker who recklessly makes a threat may be convicted under
the statute. This Note argues that convicting a reckless speaker would be
consistent with both principles of statutory interpretation and the First
Amendment. It advocates for this result particularly because it would
protect victims of domestic violence.
This Note argues that courts should interpret the statute to allow a
speaker who makes a threat recklessly to be convicted for three reasons.
First, such interpretation is consistent with principles of statutory
interpretation. Second, it is consistent with the First Amendment. Finally,
this interpretation is appropriate because threats are an integral part of a
pattern of domestic abuse, and given this unique power structure, defining
the crime in this way protects the victims. Precedent supports using policy
to interpret a statute, and courts should do so here.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, the Supreme Court decided Elonis v. United States,1 a
much-anticipated case that concerns the crime of making a threat. The
Court held that although the text of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)2 does not expressly
contain a mens rea requirement, a speaker may be convicted when she
“transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with the
knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat” and not when
she conveys a statement that may objectively be a threat but not
subjectively intended as such.3 The majority declined to decide whether a
defendant who makes a reckless threat, i.e., one who knowingly disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the communication would be
interpreted as a true threat, may be convicted under the statute.4 Justice
Alito concurred with the Court’s rejection of the negligence standard.
However, he dissented on the Court’s avoidance of the recklessness
question, stating that the Court “granted review in this case to resolve a
disagreement among the Circuits,” but “[t]he Court has compounded—not
clarified—the confusion.”5

1. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce
any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.”).
3. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 (emphasis added).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2014.
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There is much scholarship on internet speech,6 violence in rap lyrics,7
mens rea standards in threat statutes,8 and intent standards in other kinds of
speech torts and crimes.9 The question Elonis left open can be analyzed
using these ideas explored in previous scholarship.
Elonis rejected the rule used by the majority of courts of appeals.10 Prior
to Elonis, the majority of courts of appeals held that whether a statement is
a criminal threat turns on whether a reasonable person would understand it
as such, not whether the speaker intended it to be a threat.11 After Elonis,
the circuits must apply the (previously minority) rule that a speaker may be
convicted when she intends a statement to be or knows a statement will be
taken as a threat. The circuits must now resolve the ambiguity regarding
recklessness.12
There are several important reasons for courts to resolve this ambiguity.
Speakers need a clear standard, both before and after they speak. Before
artists disseminate work, they need to know whether they are protected or
can be convicted for their knowing disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that someone will interpret the statement as a true threat.
After a threat has been made, a clear standard is critical both to speakers,
who stand to lose their liberty to criminal sanctions, and to victims, whose
safety may depend on the speaker’s conviction or acquittal. This statute
also has a profound impact on domestic violence victims, and so courts
should continue to develop the doctrine of threats following Elonis,
particularly with the victims of domestic violence in mind. There is a need
to analyze the public policy implications of convicting reckless speakers,
taking into account that fact-finding comes with often-substantial costs,
both to the prosecution and to the victims of threats.
Threats are instrumental in gaining control of a victim through
intimidation, isolation, and control—a strategy that forms the core of
domestic abuse.13 K. Daniel O’Leary, a psychologist, argues that the issue
6. See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search
Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2014); P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in
True Threat Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages,
37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Clay Calvert et al., Rap Music and the True Threats Quagmire: When
Does One Man’s Lyric Become Another’s Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Karen Roenfield, Note, Redefining the Question: Applying a Hierarchical
Structure to the Mens Rea Requirement for Section 875(c), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837
(2008).
9. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & Gilbert Cranberg, Institutional Reckless Disregard
for Truth in Public Defamation Actions Against the Press, 90 IOWA L. REV. 887 (2005); Paul
T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225 (2006).
10. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
11. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2013).
12. Because Elonis was not decided on constitutional grounds, Congress could resolve
this issue by amending the statute. But it is likely that charges will be brought under
§ 875(c) before Congress can act, if it decides to do so. Thus, courts will consider this issue
in the near future.
13. Brief of Amici Curiae National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support
of Respondent at 14 & nn.11–12, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983) [hereinafter NNEDV
Br.].
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of psychological abuse, including threats, deserves analysis, targeted
treatment, and deterrents separate from those aimed at physical abuse.14
His empirical research shows that “psychological abuse almost always
precedes physical abuse,”15 and there are “direct paths from psychological
aggression to physical aggression.”16 Further, “Overall comparisons of
physical and psychological aggression . . . indicate that the psychological
abuse [has] a greater impact than the physical abuse.”17 His research shows
this striking relationship:
To address the question of the relative impact of emotional and physical
abuse, subjects rated whether emotional or physical abuse had a more
negative impact on them. Seventy-two percent of the women rated
emotional abuse as having a more negative impact on them than the
physical abuse. . . . Approximately half of the sample (54 [percent])
could predict the physical abuse they might receive from the emotional
abuse they received. Threats of abuse . . . were predictors of later
physical violence. Using a regression analysis, it was determined that
threat of abuse was a very strong predictor that physical abuse would
follow.18

And as a National Network to End Domestic Violence amicus curiae brief
argued, modern technology, particularly social media platforms, gives
abusers “potent tools to threaten their victims.”19 The organization in part
attributes this growing danger to the ease and immediacy of social media:
“Emotional impulses that in the past were often tempered by distance and
time can now immediately be turned into easily-communicated threats.”20
Further, the resolution of this issue affects how civil protection orders,
“arguably [the] most important legal remedy for domestic violence,” are
issued.21 Many states require proof of a crime to receive a civil protection
order.22 Judges tasked with these cases thus reference the criminal law in
issuing a civil remedy. A tougher criminal standard may lead to suboptimal
protection for domestic violence victims.23
This Note addresses the central question left open by Elonis and its
weighty implications: What is the lowest mens rea burden the government
must carry to convict a speaker under § 875(c)? Part I of this Note
14. K. Daniel O’Leary, Psychological Abuse: A Variable Deserving Critical Attention
in Domestic Violence, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 11–15 (1999).
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 13.
19. NNEDV Br., supra note 13, at 4. The National Network to End Domestic Violence
brief points out that “almost ninety percent of the 759 agencies [in fifty-five of the fifty-nine
states and territories] reported that their victims had been intimidated or threatened via
technology.” Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment & Appeals Project & Professor
Margaret Drew as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, Elonis v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983) [hereinafter DVLE Br.].
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 42–43.
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discusses the Elonis case, its precedent, and the legal standards surrounding
mens rea, speech crimes, and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of similar
statutes. Part II articulates the question the Supreme Court left open and the
tools that lower courts likely will use to resolve it. Finally, Part III
concludes that conviction of a reckless speaker is acceptable as a matter of
statutory and constitutional interpretation and that lower courts should
adopt this standard.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF THREATS
This part discusses the legal doctrine regarding criminal intent standards,
the nature of threats and the legal doctrines governing them, and principles
of statutory interpretation. It then explores a spectrum of protected and
unprotected threats. These legal issues set the stage for the question
presented to the Supreme Court in Elonis.
A. Elonis v. United States: The Current Standard
Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket/Is it
thick enough to stop a bullet?24

In May 2010, Tara Elonis left her husband, petitioner Anthony Douglas
Elonis.25 They had been married for nearly seven years and had two
children together.26
After Tara moved out with their children, Anthony posted violent
statements specifically referencing, and apparently speaking directly to, her
on Facebook, a social media website.27 These statements included: “If I
only knew then what I know now, I would have smothered your ass with a
pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, dropped you off in Toad Creek,
and made it look like a rape and murder,” and “[t]here’s one way to love
you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to rest until your body
is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts. . . . So hurry up
and die, bitch, so I can forgive you.”28 Tara was not his “friend” on
Facebook, but the posts were public, and she saw them within two days.29
In part as a result of these posts, Tara obtained a protection from abuse
order (PFA) against Anthony.30 During a three-hour hearing before a
judge, Tara presented Anthony’s Facebook posts with other evidence to
show that he was a danger to her and their children.31 The judge granted

24. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006 (quoting the lyrics that Anthony Douglas Elonis posted on
Facebook).
25. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013).
26. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004; Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
27. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
28. Id.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21–22, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983).
30. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324.
31. Joint Appendix at 149, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-938).
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the order, and Anthony was barred from threatening, harassing, or
contacting Tara both directly and indirectly.32
After the PFA was issued, Anthony continued to post statements on
Facebook about and addressed to Tara. Just three days after his wife
received the PFA, Anthony posted the script of a comedy sketch he and
Tara had seen together.33 He altered the script to reference his wife in a
manner she found threatening.34 The edited version made fun of the
distinction between threatening to kill his wife and talking about
threatening to kill his wife (the original work made fun of the same
distinction with respect to threatening to kill the President, a reference to 18
U.S.C. § 871).35
Where the original sketch discussed specific plans to kill the target,
Anthony substituted accurate details about where Tara was living with their
children at that time.36 The details included an accurate diagram of the
home and highlighted one location as “the best place to fire a mortar
launcher . . . because of easy access to a getaway road and . . . a clear line of
sight through the sun room.”37 He concluded the post with a link to the
original comedy sketch and stated: “Art is about pushing limits. I’m
willing to go to jail for my Constitutional rights. Are you?”38
Tara “never considered any of [the posts] false just because [they were]
in lyric form.”39 She testified that the post made her feel “like [she] was
being stalked,” and she “felt extremely afraid for [herself], [her] children
and [her] family’s lives.”40 She also testified that Anthony had no
aspiration to become a rapper and in fact “very rarely [listened] to rap
music.”41
From violent statements written in prose and rewriting the script of a
comedy sketch, Anthony progressed to posting original rap lyrics
conveying violent messages directed at his ex-wife, judges, and FBI agents.
The lyrics included:
32. Nina Totenburg, Is a Threat Posted on Facebook Really a Threat?, NPR (Dec. 1,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/01/366534452/is-a-threat-posted-on-facebook-really-athreat [https://perma.cc/T6H6-8SZR].
33. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 18 (quoting a satirical sketch by the
sketch comedy group “Whitest Kids U’Know”).
34. Id.
35. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005 (“Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to
kill my wife?/ . . . /I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal to go on
Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would
be from the cornfield behind it because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a
clear line of sight through the sun room.”).
36. Joint Appendix, supra note 31, at 145–55.
37. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
38. Id. at 2006.
39. Joint Appendix, supra note 31, at 160.
40. Adam Liptak, On the Next Docket: How the First Amendment Applies to Social
Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/politics/
supreme-court-facebook-rap-lyrics-free-speech.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YE6B-U2KN].
41. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321, 325 (3d. Cir. 2013) (discussing Tara’s
testimony that she had never heard Anthony rap in their seven years of marriage and rarely
even saw him listen to rap music); Joint Appendix, supra note 31, at 159.
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Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
. . . Me thinks the Judge needs an education
on true threat jurisprudence
[And] I’ve got enough explosives
to take care of the State Police and the Sheriff’s department
. . . So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant
. . . Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ a bomb
Why do you think it took me so long to get dressed with no shoes on?42

After another violent post in which he alluded to shooting up an
elementary school, a female agent visited Anthony’s home to investigate.43
In response, Anthony posted: “You know your shit’s ridiculous/when you
have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door/Little Agent lady stood so close/Took all
the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost/Pull my knife, flick my wrist,
and slit her throat/Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her
partner.”44
At the end of several posts, Anthony claimed that the lyrics were purely
expressive and a form of art. He stated that the lyrics were strictly
“fictitious” and that he was “doing this for [himself]” because “writing is
therapeutic.”45 He later testified that posting the lyrics helped him “deal
with the pain.”46
B. Criminal Intent Standards for Threats
This Note now addresses the legal standards relevant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c), the statute at issue in Elonis. This section begins by discussing
the nature of threats, then proceeds to explain the kinds of intent recognized
in criminal law, and finally discusses how courts have interpreted statutes
that are silent as to the requisite intent in previous cases.
1. What Is a Threat?
The ambiguity over what it means to make a threat47 generated the issue
in Elonis and the cases that came before it.48 Before analyzing whether the
42. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325–26.
43. Id. at 326.
44. Id. In the context of Anthony’s other posts, it seems possible that these lyrics also
were written about his wife. This is a conjecture, but it seems killing a woman and leaving
her bleeding in the arms of her (romantic or police) partner could refer to his wife as well as
the FBI agent, which may be why Tara understood this post as a real threat against her.
45. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005 (2015).
46. Id.
47. The word “threat” is the noun form of the word “threatens,” which is the verb found
in § 875(c). The word “threat” also can bear a slightly different meaning when used as a
subject, predicate, or complement noun, e.g., “she was a threat to those around her,” but this
Note only discusses the word as it relates to the verb in the statute.
48. Courts have tried to resolve this ambiguity and define the word “threat.” See United
States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976), abrogated by Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(adopting an objective test for § 875(c), and holding that “a narrow construction of the word
‘threat’ . . . is consonant with the protection of First Amendment interests. . . . So long as the
threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal,
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statute allows convicting a speaker for making a reckless threat, it is
important to note that “threat” has been interpreted and defined in many
ways since and before the statute was enacted.49
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “threat” as “[a] communicated intent to
inflict harm or loss on another.”50 Webster’s dictionary defines it as “an
expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage.”51 These and other
definitions are unclear as to whether the speaker must intend to inflict the
harm that results from the communication, or may merely intend to
communicate something that does in fact inflict harm. Specifically, the
ambiguity is over whether the “communicated intent” must accurately
reflect the speaker’s intent to inflict the harm.
2. Standards of Intent
Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked.52

Federal statutory crimes consist of an act or omission (the actus reus) and
a mental state with respect to that act (the mens rea).53 The objective
elements of actus reus are the conduct, its result, and the attendant
circumstances, and the statute may attach different mens reas to each of
these elements.54 As is the case in § 875(c), statutes rarely perfectly

unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of
purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied”); infra
Part I.C.
49. As a threshold matter, Chief Justice Roberts opined that neither Anthony Elonis nor
the Government “identified any indication of a particular mental state requirement in the text
of [§] 875(c).” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008–09.
50. Threat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
51. Threat, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976). Justice Alito
endorses this definition in his concurring opinion. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
52. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 n.9 (1952) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881)).
53. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436–37 (1978).
54. Elonis resolved a split in the circuits over whether § 875(c) was a crime of specific
or general intent—holding unequivocally that the statute requires specific intent. See Elonis,
135 S. Ct. at 2012. The difference between specific and general intent is the actor’s mental
state with respect to the consequences of her conduct. A general intent crime requires that
the defendant “possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime” and has no
mental state requirement as to the result or circumstances. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S.
255, 268 (2000). For the majority in Carter, Justice Thomas succinctly articulated the
distinction between specific and general intent using an example:
In Lewis, a person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but
deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being
arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though
this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money
(satisfying “general intent”), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of
its possession of the money (failing to satisfy “specific intent”).
Id. at 268–69 (citing United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, 315 (2d ed.
2015)). In his dissent in Elonis, Justice Thomas opined that for § 875(c) threats, “general
intent . . . requires no more than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication,
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articulate the mens rea with respect to each element; thus, courts must
decide what mens rea is sufficient for conviction.55
Model Penal Code56 (MPC) section 2.02 defines the four mental states
usually included in a statute: acting purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently.57 The definitions in the MPC provide the basic ideas of each
mental state, but when applied, courts need to interpret them in a more
nuanced manner to capture the behavior the statute was intended to
criminalize.58
The mental states most difficult for the government to prove are
purpose59 and knowledge, and the line between them is “razor-thin.”60
According to the MPC, a defendant acts “purposely” when her conscious
object is to engage in conduct that produces the result while she is aware of
the attendant circumstances.61 A defendant acts “knowingly” when she is
aware that her conduct is of a specific nature, is “practically certain” that
the result will obtain, and is aware that the circumstances exist.62 For
crimes requiring purpose or knowledge, the defendant need only be aware
of the attendant circumstances.
Before the MPC defined these terms, knowledge and purpose often were
conflated.63 But even with the definitions, it is difficult to articulate the
practical difference between a result that is the defendant’s conscious object
and a result that the defendant practically is certain will obtain. Some
academics suggest abandoning it.64 Even with the MPC definitions,

knew the words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary meaning of those
words in the relevant context.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018.
55. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424–25 (1985).
56. The MPC is not a statute; it is written by the American Law Institute. It is
instructive, but carries no legal authority on its own. Each state has its own criminal code
defining these terms.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Many statutes use other terms
like “maliciously” or “corruptly.” At oral arguments in Elonis, the attorneys and justices
discussed only the four articulated in the MPC, and thus this Note focuses only on those
four. The MPC does not rely on definitions of specific and general intent. See Justin Myer
Lichterman, Note, True Threats: Evolving Mens Rea Requirements for Violations of 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1990 n.159 (2001) (noting that the MPC
definitions “disregard the awkward concepts of specific intent and general intent”).
58. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 54, at 257–58.
59. Confusingly, “purpose” and “intent” are used broadly and sometimes
interchangeably. See Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 79, 82 (2013) (“[N]ot every jurisdiction understands intent in the same
way. . . . The word is notoriously vague and captures situations where the defendant desires
a particular outcome as well as situations where the defendant is aware of the practical
certainty of the outcome but is indifferent to the result. This is precisely why [the MPC]
abandoned the ambiguous language of intent in favor of the more precise categories of
purpose and knowledge.”).
60. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43:6, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)
(No. 13-983).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
62. Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
63. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 54, at 261.
64. See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147
(2008).
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distinguishing between purpose and intent, both as a legal matter and on the
facts of a case, is difficult.65
There is a bigger conceptual difference between knowledge and
recklessness. According to the MPC, a defendant is reckless with respect to
an element of a crime when she “consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists” and doing so is a “gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation.”66
Finally, the distinction between recklessness and negligence also is
significant. To prove a defendant was reckless, the prosecution must show
beyond a reasonable doubt that she was aware of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk.67 To prove negligence, the prosecution need only show
an actor should have been aware of the risk.68
3. Silent Statutes
Some statutes, like 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), do not specify the required mens
rea—or whether a mens rea is required at all. In Elonis, the Supreme Court
relied on its precedent regarding statutes that are ambiguous or silent with
respect to mens rea.69 In the precedent cited in Elonis, the Court
definitively closed the gap that the legislature left open in writing the
statute. In Elonis, the majority used this reasoning but explicitly left open
the recklessness question.70
The MPC states that acting recklessly will satisfy the mens rea
requirement when the statute does not articulate a mens rea.71 A minimum
of recklessness means that being at least aware of and disregarding a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of wrongdoing (recklessness) suffices for
conviction, and lacking that awareness (negligence) is insufficient. In this
way, the MPC sets the default mens rea that separates wrongful from
innocent conduct. But, if this construction is contrary to the clear
interpretation of the statute, courts do not hesitate to insert a different
mental state.72

65. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2 (2d ed. 2015) (“The
meaning of the word “intent” in the criminal law has always been rather obscure. . . . Intent
has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one
intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or
knows that those consequences are substantially certain to result from his acts. The modern
view, however, is that it is better to draw a distinction between intent (or purpose) on the one
hand and knowledge on the other.”).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
67. Id.
68. See id. § 2.02(2)(d).
69. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009–11 (2015).
70. Id. at 2013.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3).
72. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 65, at 257.
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a. Statutory Interpretation
When a statute does not explicitly include a mens rea, the Court does not
assume that Congress intended for a crime to be strict liability; rather, the
Court “construe[s] the statute in light of [the common law] in which the
requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded,”73 “[a]bsent
clear congressional intent to the contrary.”74 The relevant background rule
that a statute should distinguish between those who act “knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly from those who [act] by accident or by mistake,
is ‘as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil.’”75 The goal is to isolate the
wrongful part of the act to avoid criminalizing “apparently innocent
conduct.”76
The Court identifies the appropriate mental state using the plain language
of the statute,77 background principles of the relevant area of law,78 and
other tools.79 Congress’s intent in enacting the statute is the “lodestar” in
“determining the mental state of a defendant that the government must
prove.”80 As then-Judge Sotomayor noted in United States v. Figueroa,81
those principles include “a very strong presumption that some mental state
is required” and the “equally strong” presumption that the actor have a
“guilty mind.”82
The Court held in Morissette v. United States,83 a case regarding
conversion of government property that the defendant believed to be
abandoned, that a statute’s silence with respect to mens rea was not a
rejection of an intent requirement. Rather, the silence “merely recognized
that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no
statutory affirmation” because crime generally results from the
“concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand.”84
73. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1994).
74. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998). In some statutes
without an explicit mens rea requirement, particularly when the repercussions for conviction
are small, an interpretation of strict liability is appropriate. See Holdridge v. United States,
282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (“[W]here a federal criminal statute omits mention of
intent and . . . where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely
besmirch, [and] where the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common
law, . . . the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent.”).
75. Id. at 115 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1951)).
76. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1984).
77. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1916).
78. See Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 115.
79. Id. (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978)).
80. United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000).
81. 165 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
82. Id. at 115.
83. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
84. Id. at 251–52. In this case, the defendant collected and sold spent shell casings that
he believed in good faith were abandoned. Id. at 248–49. The casings in fact belonged to the
U.S. government. Id. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction for “knowingly
convert[ing]” government property because he did not have the requisite mental state, i.e., he
did not know the property belonged to the government. Id. at 271.
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Similarly, the Court used these principles to interpret a statute silent on
mens rea in Liparota v. United States,85 a case regarding unauthorized use
of food stamps. It noted that Congress’s “failure . . . to indicate whether
mens rea is required does not signal a departure from this background
assumption of our criminal law.”86 In fact, interpreting the statute to
include an intent requirement is especially important when omitting such a
requirement would “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct.”87 Thus, the Court held that a statute criminalizing knowingly
using or possessing food stamps in an unauthorized manner required that
the defendant know “the facts that made the use of the food stamps
unauthorized.”88
b. Policy in Interpretation
Commentators have argued that the Court uses policy as well as canons
of statutory construction.89 On at least two occasions, the Court arguably
has used policy to justify its result when interpreting a criminal statute that
is silent as to mens rea. First, in Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States,90
the Court was tasked with deciding whether to interpret a statutory term
subjectively or objectively.91 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 made
transporting “drug paraphernalia,” defined as “any equipment . . . primarily
intended or designed for use” with illegal drugs, a crime.92 The Court held
that this was an objective definition; items generally used with drugs satisfy
the statute, regardless of whether the defendant intended the items to be
used with drugs.93
The Court relied on the plain text and structure of the statute.94 It noted
that Congress’s choice of words was meaningful and distinguished the
objective “designed for use” from “primarily intended.”95 The Court
further held that Congress could have left out one of these terms or required
evidence that the defendant have subjective intent toward the use of the
materials.96 Combined with the natural reading of the statute and these
considerations, the Court held that “intended for use” does not require that
the defendant intend the product be used with drugs, but rather “refers
85. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
86. Id. at 426.
87. Id.
88. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2010 (2015) (citing Liparota, 471 U.S. at
425).
89. See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law
and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 342, 398–400 nn.249–51
(2001).
90. 511 U.S. 513 (1994).
91. Id. at 514.
92. Id. at 517 (citing Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(codified at 18 U.S.C. 857(d))).
93. Id. at 517–18.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 518–19 (discussing that some paraphernalia has no other use besides with
drugs and thus must be “designed for use” with a drug).
96. Id. at 520.
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generally to an item’s likely use.”97 In addition, the Court held that these
principles require “the Government to prove that the defendant knowingly
[was] part of a scheme to sell items that he knew were likely to be used
with illegal drugs.”98
Professor Robert Batey argues that judges tend to interpret a statute to
include the mental state that achieves results they think are best rather than
the one that is truest to the statute.99 He argues that the decision in Posters
‘N’ Things was based in anti-drug policy choices rather than rules of
statutory construction.100 This interpretation made convictions in drug
cases easier for the prosecution to obtain. Professor Batey describes the
decision as “result-oriented” and reflecting the justices’ desire “not to
saddle federal prosecutors with the difficult burden” of proving the
defendant wanted the items to be used with drugs.101 Posters ‘N’ Things’s
rhetoric fits the policy goal of being tough on drugs, which was popular at
the time.102
Furthermore, in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,103 the Court
again isolated the wrongful action that a statute intended to ban and read the
The statute criminalized
statute to capture only that content.104
“knowingly” transporting material that “involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”105 After reviewing the grammatical
structure of the statute, the Court held that “knowingly” modifies both
“transport” and “use of a minor.”106
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the majority carried the rules of
construction too far because the presumption in favor of a mental state
overpowered his reading of the plain text of the statute.107 He wrote that
“[t]oday’s opinion converts the rule of interpretation into a rule of law,
contradicting the plain import of what Congress has specifically prescribed
regarding criminal intent.”108
Justice Scalia’s interpretation of this statute also relied on policy
considerations. He argued that the statute under which the defendant was
convicted clearly was intended to protect children.109 He pointed out that
the majority narrowed the group of defendants who can be convicted for
97. Id. at 521.
98. Id. at 523–24.
99. Batey, supra note 89, at 344.
100. Id. at 384 nn.249–51.
101. Id. at 348.
102. See, e.g., Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes—
Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 24 n.102 (1997); see also Batey, supra note 89,
at 348; Eric E. Sterling, Drug Laws and Snitching: A Primer, PBS: FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/primer (last visited Apr. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/2988-C47S].
103. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
104. Id.
105. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(1)(A) (1977).
106. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 78.
107. Id. at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 85.
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transporting child pornography.110 Because “the producers of these
materials are not always readily found” and the majority’s interpretation
means that fewer people who transport the pornography will be convicted,
Justice Scalia argued that child pornography may now be bought and sold
more frequently.111 The majority’s interpretation will change how child
pornography is produced and will strengthen its market, rather than “dry it
up” as Congress intended.112 He noted that he was “concerned that the
Court’s suggestion [would] leave the world’s children inadequately
protected.”113
Further, Justice Scalia argued that stricter liability would not violate
defendants’ First Amendment rights. Recalling the policy goals of the First
Amendment,114 he wrote, “the First Amendment will lose none of its value
to a free society if those who knowingly place themselves in the stream of
pornographic commerce are obliged to make sure that they are not
subsidizing child abuse.”115
C. A Spectrum of Speech
Speech is regulated and protected according to its form and content. A
First Amendment analysis always is necessary when a law governs a type
of speech, like political speech, which it usually fiercely protects.116 Other
speech is so harmful and of such little value to society that it may be
proscribed without offending the First Amendment. The Court has
protected speech in the vast middle of that spectrum in accordance with the
principles of the First Amendment.
The federal courts have developed doctrines to distinguish among these
kinds of speech and to determine to what extent regulation is
constitutionally permissible. In the following cases, the Supreme Court
evaluates laws prohibiting speech in light of the mental state of a speaker.
1. Fighting Words
You are . . . a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are
Fascists or agents of Fascists.117

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,118 the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not protect these and other fighting words.119 There,
petitioner was standing on a public sidewalk denouncing other religions in
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 83.
114. See infra Part I.C.
115. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 85.
116. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The First Amendment
‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))).
117. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 568 (1942).
118. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
119. Id. at 568.
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accordance with his faith as a Jehovah’s Witness.120 A “disturbance”
followed, and Chaplinsky was arrested under a New Hampshire statute
prohibiting “address[ing] any offensive, derisive or annoying word . . . with
intent to deride, offend or annoy [any person in a public place].”121
The Court held that fighting words “by their very utterance inflict
injury,” and thus proscribing “fighting words” like “the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous” is not unconstitutional.122 Though the words may
be attached to protected expression, the gravamen of the statutory offense is
inciting the fear and panic inherent in the words and the manner in which
they are spoken.123 Proscribing these “well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech [has] never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”124
The Court highlighted one theory that justified the inclusion of the First
Amendment in the Constitution: speech and free discourse must be
protected because they are necessary for a functioning democracy.125 The
value of speech as personal expression is secondary to its value as a mode
of societal development.126 Therefore, the Court defines the bounds of First
Amendment protection in light of this policy goal imagined by the Framers
that continues to be important today.127 Fighting words do not promote the
exchange of ideas. They do not improve democracy or social order. The
speech is of low value and afforded little to no First Amendment
protection.128
2. Political Hyperbole and Acts
[N]ow I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have
got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If

120. Id. at 569–70.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 572. This list of categories has changed significantly since 1942. While
Chaplinsky is still good law, the decision has been criticized. See, e.g., Burton Caine, The
Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 450 (2004).
123. See Caine, supra note 122.
124. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
125. Id. at 572 (“[Fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); see also Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (“[The Founders] believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth.”).
126. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375; see also Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156
(1936) (“The only reason why the law makes truth a defense is not because a libel must be
false, but because the utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest paramount to
reputation; it is like a privileged communication, which is privileged only because the law
prefers it conditionally to reputation.”).
127. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free
Speech Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2203 (2006) (noting that the First
Amendment promotes discourse and strengthens democracy because it protects unpopular
ideas on the fringes of the political spectrum and allows them to be heard).
128. But this view has been criticized. See id.
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they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J. . . . They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.129

Like speech that incites violence, true threats are unprotected by the First
Amendment. The challenge since Watts v. United States130 has been
defining “true threats.”131 In Watts, an eighteen-year-old boy was
convicted for “knowingly and willfully” making a threat against the
President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) after he made the above
statement at a public rally.132 On appeal, the Court held that conviction
“requires the Government to prove a true threat” and the statement was a
“kind of political hyperbole” that does not fit within the statutory meaning
of “threat.”133
The Court evaluated the speech and statute and decided the case using the
same policy grounding of the First Amendment as it did in Chaplinsky.134
The decision also introduced the true threats doctrine.135 The Court
balanced the societal interest in protecting the President136 “against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, [including]
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.”137
The Court, however, did not develop the idea of true threats in its short
per curiam decision. A line of cases following Watts, including Elonis,
articulated the nuances of what counts as a true threat.138
129. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam).
130. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
131. See id. at 706.
132. See id. at 705–06; 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012) (criminalizing making “any threat to
take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States”).
In Watts, the Court did not reach whether the lower court’s interpretation of the statute’s
“willfulness” requirement was correct, but it expressed “grave doubts” about the lower
court’s interpretation. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
133. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 707 (“The [United States] undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming,
interest in protecting the safety of its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his
duties without interference from threats of physical violence.” (citing H.R. 652, 64th Cong.
(1916))).
137. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Sullivan,
discussed infra Part I.C.4, is a landmark case concerning the tort of libel and the intent
standard sufficient to protect society from defamation but still promote public discourse on
important societal issues. Though Sullivan is a tort case, it is cited frequently in discussing
true threats and other speech act crimes. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 421
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (supporting the proposition that “the level of protection
given to speech depends upon its subject matter . . . . Much of our First Amendment
jurisprudence is premised on the assumption that content makes a difference.”); Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47–48 (1975) (noting that a statute prohibiting threats against the
President will only deter speakers who intend to make a threat, and “that degree of
deterrence would have substantial costs in discouraging the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wideopen’ debate that the First Amendment is intended to protect” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
270)).
138. See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982); see also Virginia v. Black, 583 U.S. 343 (2003).
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These are the far ends of the field of verbal speech: on one side, speech
that is so harmful that even without any mental state attached, it may be
proscribed and, on the other, speech that is so hyperbolic and wrapped in
the heart of the First Amendment—political speech—that the Constitution
protects it. Anthony Elonis’s social media posts are reminiscent of both; he
criticizes policies of the judiciary and the police, but also very realistically
indicates how and why his soon-to-be ex-wife should be murdered.139
3. Cross Burning
Not all threats require words. This Note now turns to the Supreme
Court’s interpretations of statutes proscribing nonverbal threats that fall in
the middle of the speech spectrum. In Virginia v. Black,140 the Court used
intent to intimidate to distinguish between cross burnings that are true
threats and cross burnings that are protected by the First Amendment.141
As in Chaplinsky and Watts, the Court balanced the societal interest in
promoting expression of political beliefs with the real harm such statements
can cause.142
The respondents in Black were convicted under a Virginia statute that
criminalized burning a cross with intent to intimidate and also made the act
of burning a cross prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.143 One
respondent had burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally in an open, privately
owned field with the permission of the owner.144 Attendees at the rally
spoke about “what they were” and “what they believed in.”145 The other
two respondents had driven “a truck onto [an African-American neighbor’s]
property, planted a cross, and set it on fire. Their apparent motive was to
‘get back’ at [the neighbor] for complaining.”146
The majority opinion further developed the true threat doctrine
introduced in Watts.147 The Court held that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass
those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.”148 Again, the Court emphasized that
139. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005 (2015) (“I also found out that it’s
incredibly illegal [to say] the best place to fire a mortar launcher at her house would be from
the cornfield behind it because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a clear line
of sight through the sun room.”).
140. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
141. Id. at 361–62.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 348 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1950) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or
cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public
place. . . . Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.”)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 350.
147. Id. at 359.
148. Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized words generated the circuit split that Elonis
resolved.
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these threats are actions that may be regulated like actions even if they have
political content because “a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s]
individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear
Therefore, these true threats may be proscribed
engenders.’”149
constitutionally because they are sufficiently different from speech that is
scary to its audience but nonetheless protected.
The majority for the Court also held that the prima facie evidence
provision of the statute “strips away the very reason why a State may ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate.”150 If the defendant exercised
her constitutional right not to defend herself, the prima facie provision
requires that she be convicted of making a threat on the act of burning a
cross alone, which is the very reason proscribing cross burning does not
violate the First Amendment.151 In that case, the intent requirement
effectively would be written out of the statute because a jury could convict
her based on the act of cross burning alone.152
The intent requirement, the Court held, is the difference between “core
political speech” and “constitutionally proscribable intimidation.”153 The
prima facie evidence provision “ignores all of the contextual factors that are
necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is intended to
intimidate,” and thus the provision captures too much protected speech.154
The true threats analysis requires a more nuanced distinction that does not
“blur[] the line between these two meanings of a burning cross”155 and does
not punish “crudely worded ideas.”156 The Court did not, however,
distinguish between the different levels of mens rea encompassed within the
word “intent.”
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the statute is constitutional in its
entirety because intent to threaten is inseparable from cross burning.157
There is a well-documented history of violence that almost always followed
cross burning, which he argued is inseparable from the act. Intimidation
(reasonably) always accompanies the act, and thus there is no protected
expression in the act of burning a cross.158
Unlike the majority, Justice Thomas would focus on the objective result
of the action in context of the American history of violence associated with
149. Id. at 359–60 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 365.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The defendants in this case showed this difference clearly; the defendant who
burned a cross at the Ku Klux Klan rally was expressly political and did not directly target a
specific person, whereas the defendants who burned a cross in a neighbor’s yard specifically
and personally targeted a person they did not like.
154. Id. at 367.
155. Id. at 365.
156. Crane, supra note 9, at 1272.
157. See Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 388, 394–95 (“And, just as one cannot burn down someone’s house to make a
political point and then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize
and intimidate to make their point. In light of my conclusion that the statute here addresses
only conduct, there is no need to analyze it under any of our First Amendment tests.”).
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a burning cross, not the subjective intent of the actor.159 Because burning a
cross reasonably is expected to provoke fear and intimidation given the
historically strong connection between a burning cross and horrific
violence, Justice Thomas would hold that this does not violate the First
Amendment.160 And, even if protected content were present in the action,
the prima facie evidence provision is rebuttable so the defendant would not
be deprived of her due process.161
This line of cases developing the true threat doctrine left an open
question for the circuits162: Must an alleged threat be subjectively intended
to be a threat or just objectively threatening? Or both?
4. Libelous Words
Under defamation law, speech also is regulated based on the mental state
of the author at the time she published the statement.163 Since 1964 when
the Supreme Court first announced the actual malice standard in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,164 the Court has required that a defendant act with
some level of intent to be held liable for various kinds of libel.165 The
Court chose these standards of intent by considering the value of the speech
to society, public policy goals, democratic ideals, and the boundaries of the
First Amendment.166 Because this jurisprudence also concerns mental
states and is more clearly and fully developed than true threat
jurisprudence,167 comparing the two areas is useful to the analysis of
criminal threats defined in § 875(c).168
In Sullivan, the foundational libel case, the Supreme Court held that a
public official who brings a libel suit against a defendant for publishing a
defamatory statement may not prevail unless she proves by clear and

159. Id. at 388 (“In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what
outsiders can comprehend.”).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 395–98.
162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
163. See generally Bezanson & Cranberg, supra note 9.
164. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
165. The notable difference between libel law and Elonis is that the former is civil
common law and the latter involves statutory and criminal law. Elonis, Chaplinsky, Watts,
R.A.V., and Black all concern interpretations of intent in a statute and whether and what kind
of intent is required. See supra Part I. Both statutory and common law regulations of speech
are subject to First Amendment analysis.
166. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 4, 8 (1971); see also infra Part I.B.3.
167. See generally Crane, supra note 9, at 1231 n.25.
168. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 111, 114 n.7 (2008) (“In fact, courts have sought to harmonize criminal and tort
concepts of recklessness and regularly apply the same definition in each context.”); see also
Lamb v. Anderson, 147 P.3d 736, 744–45 (Alaska 2006) (criminal and tort standards for
recklessness are virtually identical); Sandler v. Commonwealth, 644 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Mass.
1995) (“Our long-standing custom has been to measure reckless conduct by the same test
whether reckless conduct is alleged as the basis for liability in tort or as the basis for guilt of
involuntary manslaughter.”).
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convincing evidence that the author acted with “actual malice.”169 The
Court defined actual malice as acting “with knowledge that [a statement is]
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”170
Proving by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant acted with
actual malice is expensive, difficult, and invasive.171 The Supreme Court
justified imposing this high burden because free criticism of public officials
is necessary for a functioning democracy.172 Thus, the Court used the First
Amendment as an instrument to protect society when the speech performs a
function crucial to a healthy democracy, just as it did in Chaplinsky and
Watts.
The actual malice standard requires the fact finder to inquire into the
reporter’s mental state at the time she published the statement, much as fact
finders in criminal cases are required to identify the defendant’s mental
state at the time of the crime.173 But it has not been a clean solution. In a
5-4 decision with four separate dissents, the Court held in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.174 that private-figure plaintiffs must show that the defendant
acted with at least fault, but left to the states’ discretion whether to require a
higher standard.175 As in Elonis, the Court set a minimum for liability and
left the states to decide whether to require a higher standard of intent.176
In his dissent, Justice Douglas criticized the Gertz majority and argued
that a “more than fault” standard was unwieldy, particularly when the
subject of the speech is, as in this case, politically controversial.177 He
opined that “a jury determination, unpredictable in the most neutral
circumstances, becomes for those who venture to discuss heated issues, a
virtual roll of the dice separating them from liability for often massive
claims of damage.”178 Similarly, in Elonis, Justice Alito noted, “Attorneys
and judges need to know which mental state is required for conviction [but
they] are left to guess.”179

169. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
170. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
171. See Bezanson & Cranberg, supra note 9, at 890–91 (“The test’s demand that the
mind of the reporter be proved with ‘convincing clarity’ has proven difficult, invasive, and
so expensive that the losers are indistinguishable from the winners in public libel cases.”
(quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86, and citing RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW
AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 4–5 (1987))).
172. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 299.
173. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685–86 (1989)
(describing the actual malice standard as one with uncertain scope but depending on a factspecific inquiry).
174. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
175. Id. at 347.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The allegedly defamatory articles concerned
“‘[c]ommunist plots,’ ‘conspiracies against law enforcement agencies,’ and the killing of a
private citizen by the police.” Id.
178. Id.
179. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013–14 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting in
part).
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In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,180 the Court recognized that the
allocation of the burden of proof alone can in some cases dispose of the
case.181 To decide where to place the cost of difficult, costly, or impossible
fact-finding, the Court resorted to policy considerations.182
In Hepps, a newspaper published articles asserting that the plaintiff, a
local public official, had ties to organized crime.183 The Court held that the
plaintiff bore the burden of showing both that the publisher was at fault and
that the statement was actually false.184 The majority reasoned that if the
burden of proving the statement is true were on the defendant, then the
newspaper would be faced with a difficult choice: reveal its sources or face
defamation liability.185 Shifting the burden of proof is a solution grounded
in a policy decision to protect newspapers that publish stories about
dangerous people and require confidential sources and avoid this
problem.186 It is particularly important in cases like Hepps where the
stories are about organized crime and the sources face severe backlash if
they are exposed. Justice O’Connor emphasized the policy goal, opining
that “[i]n a case . . . where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we
believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in the favor of
protecting true speech.”187
The Court further recognized that “[t]here will always be instances when
the factfinding process will be unable to resolve conclusively whether the
speech is true or false; it is in those cases that the burden of proof is
dispositive.”188 Similarly, in cases of threats and possible domestic
violence, the fact-finding process may be invasive and expensive.189
Allocation of the burden of proof in those cases disposes of the action. And
in cases of threats, as in Hepps, the Court must make a policy choice and
decide on which party to place the cost of fact-finding. In Hepps, the Court
was comfortable shifting which party has to bear the cost of proving
elements of the claim to serve the important function of promoting free
discourse on dangerous topics.190 In § 875(c) cases, the Court should
consider protecting the party that, in the Court’s judgment, is at the heart of
the goals of the law by noting who has to prove what and interpreting the
statute accordingly.

180. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
181. Id. at 776.
182. Id. at 776–77 (discussing the chilling effects that potentially would result from
holding otherwise).
183. Id. at 769.
184. Id. at 776.
185. Id. at 779.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 776.
188. Id.
189. See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence As a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2007).
190. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776.
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II. THE QUESTION THAT IS LEFT:
IS RECKLESSNESS ENOUGH?
Elonis applied this messy doctrine to threats and resolved a circuit split
that developed regarding whether the true threat must be subjectively
intended to be threatening or objectively interpreted as a threat. But the
Court did not apply the doctrine to defendants who speak recklessly over
the protests of Justices Alito and Thomas. As Justice Thomas noted, with
respect to recklessness, the Court “cast[] aside the approach used in nine
Circuits and [left] nothing in its place.”191 “Lower courts are thus left to
guess at the appropriate mental state for § 875(c).”192
In his partially dissenting opinion, Justice Alito agreed with the majority
that the Court should read in some mental state as to the nature of the
communication.193 But, he reasoned, “once we have reached recklessness,
we have gone as far as we can without stepping over the line that separates
interpretation from amendment.”194 The definition of recklessness195
includes some wrongful behavior, and thus the defendant necessarily knows
her conduct is not innocent.
Below, this Note analyzes the law Elonis did articulate, how the Court
construed the statute, and the decision’s impact on the First Amendment.
A. The Law of Elonis at the Third Circuit
In December 2010, Anthony Elonis was arrested and charged with five
counts of making a threat in violation of § 875(c) on the basis of his
Facebook posts.196 At trial, Anthony requested the jury be instructed that
conviction requires “inten[t] to communicate a true threat.”197 Instead, the
trial court instructed the jury that conviction requires “intentionally
[making] a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates . . . as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”198
Following this instruction, the jury found Anthony guilty of four of the five
counts, and he was sentenced to forty-four months in prison.199
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction,
holding that recent Supreme Court cases including, Virginia v. Black, did
not displace the Third Circuit’s own precedent that used an objective

191. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2018 (2015).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
194. Id.
195. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994) (defining recklessness as
“when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware”); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
196. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321, 324–26 (3d. Cir. 2013); see infra Part I.A.
197. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 14.
198. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327 (citing Trial Transcript at 127, id. (No. 12-3798)).
199. Liptak, supra note 40.
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standard.200 It recognized that in Black, the Supreme Court did not qualify
“means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence,”201 with a requirement that the speaker intend the
listener to understand the statement as a threat. Thus, the Third Circuit
panel affirmed Anthony’s conviction.202
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Anthony argued that the objective
rule adopted by the Third Circuit and some other courts is inconsistent with
bedrock First Amendment principles and Black.203 The government can
punish speech without violating the First Amendment in very limited
circumstances, he argued, and music lyrics posted on social media without
intent to intimidate the audience is not one of them.204 He argued that
accepting the Third Circuit’s rule “that one could commit a ‘speech crime’
by accident is chilling . . . and would erode the breathing space that
safeguards the free exchange of ideas.”205
Petitioner noted that the Court has afforded “breathing space” for other
speech crimes and torts; in Sullivan, it established the actual malice
standard for defamation of public figures,206 in Brandenburg v. Ohio,207 it
established the standard of directed speech for incitement,208 and in United
States v. Alvarez,209 it established that in cases where a statute criminalizes
making a false statement, the court assumes that the speaker intended her
statement to be understood as true. The speech regulated by § 875(c), he
argued, similarly needs the “breathing space” of the subjective intent
standard.210 Many kinds of music and art use violent hyperbole and have
First Amendment value, even if mainstream listeners do not like the music
or message.211 Generally criminalizing statements that use those literary
devices “institutionalizes discrimination against minority viewpoints.”212
200. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 330; see, e.g., United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a phone call was a true threat when the defendant knowingly and
willfully placed the call and the call was reasonably perceived as a threat); United States v.
Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a true threat against the President is a
statement “in a context . . . wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm” (citations omitted)).
201. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 329 (emphasis added) (quoting Virginia v. Black, 583 U.S. 343,
359–60 (2003)).
202. Id. at 331 (citing United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005)). The
Third Circuit noted that, of all the circuits that had considered the issue at that time, only the
Ninth Circuit used a nonobjective standard. Id.
203. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 28–29.
204. Id. at 39; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 709 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
205. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 29, at 30.
206. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964) (holding that negligence is a
constitutionally insufficient standard for imposing liability for speech).
207. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
208. Id. at 447.
209. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
210. Id. at 2553.
211. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
212. Brief for Petitioner at 48, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 139837).
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In opposition, the Government argued that the purpose of prohibiting
threats is to “‘protect individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the
disruption that fear engenders.’”213 The respondent argued that Black
requires proof of subjective intent only in threat statutes that are not content
neutral and therefore not within § 875(c).214 The respondent noted that
even within the Ninth Circuit, which used the minority test of subjective
intent, panels of judges inconsistently applied intent standards in statutes
requiring subjective intent.215
B. Statutory Construction at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Third Circuit.
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, read § 875(c) as
requiring that the speaker have knowledge or intent that her statement will
be taken as a threat, rather than merely requiring that a reasonable person
would take the statement as a threat.216
The Court recognized that, as a general rule, all criminal statutes require
some mental state.217 Although the text of § 875(c) may not contain any
particular mental state, the Court has interpreted similarly silent statutes to
include the mental state that is “necessary to separate wrongful conduct
from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”218 Accordingly, the Court construed
§ 875(c) to include a mental state, just as it had done in precedent like
Morissette, Liparota, Posters ‘N’ Things, and X-Citement Video.219
To insert a mental state that adequately separates wrongful conduct from
innocent conduct, the Court identified the reason the action was
criminalized in the first place: “[C]ommunicating something is not what
makes the conduct ‘wrongful.’ Here ‘the crucial element separating legal
innocent from wrongful conduct’ is the threatening nature of the
communication.”220 “The mental state requirement must therefore apply to
the fact that the communication contains a threat.”221
C. The First Amendment
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion decided the case in favor of
Anthony Elonis on statutory interpretation grounds222 and did not reach the
213. Brief for Respondent at 16, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-9837); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
214. Brief for Respondent, supra note 213, at 43.
215. Id. at 26–37.
216. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
217. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 250 (1952) (noting that the basic
principle that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal” is “as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in the freedom of the human will and a consequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil”).
218. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269
(2000)).
219. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
220. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (emphasis omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2010–11.
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First Amendment questions.223 Both Justice Alito’s partial dissent and
Justice Thomas’s dissent arrived at less defendant-friendly positions on the
statutory issue and therefore continued on to the First Amendment issue.224
Justice Alito argued that conviction using a recklessness standard would
not offend the First Amendment.225 As Watts, Black, and other cases have
established, the First Amendment does not protect true threats.226 The First
Amendment clearly protects some art (possibly including the kind of lyrics
Anthony posted), but the context matters; just “[a] fig leaf of artistic
expression” does not save hateful, criminally threatening speech from being
hateful and criminally threatening.227
Moreover, a recklessness standard does not violate the First Amendment
and leaves adequate “breathing space” for free speech.228 A negligent
speaker is one who “should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk[,
and failure to perceive the risk] involves a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe.”229 This definition of
negligence requires that the speaker not be aware of the threatening
character of the speech. By contrast, the definition of a reckless speaker
requires being aware of the harm and disregarding it.230 The gap between
these definitions leaves sufficient breathing room to avoid the problem of
chilling First Amendment-protected speech. Because the recklessness
standard does not present any First Amendment problems, Justice Alito
argues that the Court is justified only in eliminating negligence as a
standard for conviction.231
Justice Thomas dissented, focusing on “ordinary background principles”
of criminal law to interpret the statute while reading in as little as
possible.232 Citing statutes and early state cases, he argued that the long
history of the government limiting speech without requiring specific intent
and without violating the First Amendment shows that his interpretation of
§ 875(c) does not violate the First Amendment.233 Because the Court
expressly declined to address the First Amendment question in Watts, and
the focus of Black was the prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate
rather than the circumstances under which threats constitutionally may be
protected, neither case precludes his reading of the statute on First
Amendment grounds.234

223. Id. at 2012.
224. Id. at 2016 (Alito, J., dissenting in part); id. at 2024 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2016 (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2016–17.
228. Id. at 2016 (citations omitted).
229. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
230. Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
231. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
232. Id. at 2022 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 2024 (citing statutes and early cases that penalize “transmitting a
communication containing a threat without proof of a demand to extort something from the
victim”).
234. Id. at 2026–27.
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III. RECKLESSNESS SHOULD SUFFICE FOR CONVICTION
The lower courts likely will resolve this open question the same way the
Supreme Court has resolved similar questions in Elonis and previous cases:
through statutory interpretation, by applying the First Amendment, and by
considering policy. This Note now addresses each with respect to
recklessness in turn. It concludes that requiring recklessness is a proper
statutory interpretation, does not violate the First Amendment, and supports
important policy considerations including protecting domestic violence
victims.
A. Statutory Interpretation
This section argues that courts could interpret § 875(c) to allow a
reckless speaker to be convicted consistently with principles of statutory
interpretation and the First Amendment. Ideally, Congress would amend
§ 875(c) and clearly articulate the required mens rea. Because Elonis was
decided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, Congress is free to
supersede the case and amend § 875(c) to require any mental state it deems
appropriate to capture the activity it intended to criminalize.235
As the Elonis Court concluded, the plain text of § 875(c) does not specify
any mental state, recklessness or otherwise, and thus courts interpreting the
statute must read in a mental state.236 As the Court concluded in Morissette
and its progeny, lack of a mental state does not mean Congress intended the
crime to be a strict liability crime.237 The Court must use principles of law
and rules of construction to insert a mental state.238
MPC section 2.02(3) sets recklessness as the default minimum mens
rea.239 This suggests that courts could insert the recklessness mens rea
consistent with rules of statutory construction. Although the Supreme
Court used the MPC definition of mens rea at oral argument and in its
opinions, it did not discuss section 2.02(3). Lower courts remain free to
consider this provision when interpreting § 875(c).
The Supreme Court repeatedly has isolated the wrongdoing in the
proscribed act and interpreted the statute to criminalize just that activity.240
In the case of threats, the wrongdoing is causing the real, tangible harm that
follows after making a threat; “threats of violence are, in themselves,
harmful—they cause fear and all its attendant damaging and disruptive
psychological, emotional, and physical effects.”241 They have “serious and
long-lasting psychological and emotional consequences,” particularly for

235. See Lichterman, supra note 57, at 1966 (“Congress should insert a mens rea
requirement of ‘recklessness’ into 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) in order to ensure uniform application
in the federal courts.”).
236. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001; see also supra Part II.B.
237. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also supra Part I.B.3.a.
238. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see supra Part I.B.2.
240. See supra Part I.B.3.
241. NNEDV Br., supra note 13, at 16.
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victims of domestic violence.242 True threats inflict this serious harm but
have “little if any social value.”243
Because they cause immediate and direct harm, threats are more like the
fighting words in Chaplinsky than political hyperbole in Watts, even when
they contain some semblance of political content.244 Threats and fighting
words both “by their very utterance inflict injury”245 because they “creat[e]
in their recipients a sense of fear and disturb[] their sense of security.”246
Some protected speech like political hyperbole can use rhetorical devices to
achieve the legitimate goal of criticizing the government or another
institution.247 True threats do not have that content, unlike other acts like,
burning a cross, which may have both protected political content and
unprotected threatening content.248
B. The First Amendment
Art mixed with a threat is still a threat. Words are not always protected
merely because they are mixed with protected action;249 thus, the
recklessness standard does not necessarily violate the First Amendment
merely because some threats also may be art. The First Amendment is
designed to promote discourse in the public sphere.250 In particular,
safeguarding political speech is “central to the meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment.”251
For example, the fighting words in Chaplinsky were exclaimed as the
defendant was exercising his religion as a Jehovah’s Witness by distributing
pamphlets.252 Practicing religion is protected by the First Amendment, but
the protection does not “cloak [the speaker] with immunity from the legal
consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid
criminal statute.”253 Similarly, threats cloaked in art may be analyzed as
242. DVLE Br., supra note 21, at 24 (citing Mindy B. Mechanic et al., Mental Health
Consequences of Intimate Partner Abuse: A Multidimensional Assessment of Four Different
Forms of Abuse, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 2008, at 2).
243. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
244. See supra Part I.C.1–2.
245. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
246. NNEDV Br., supra note 13, at 17 (citing United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86
(8th Cir. 1991)) (“The threat alone is disruptive of the recipient’s sense of personal safety
and well-being and is the gravamen of the offense.”).
247. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that the
alleged threat was phrased in the conditional, it was in the context of a political rally, and the
audience laughed after Watts said it); supra Part I.C.2.
248. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361–65 (2003); infra Part III.C. But see Black,
538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing cross burning is always in itself
threatening because it is inseparable from its history of preceding violence).
249. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 569 (holding that fighting words accusing the government of being “Fascists or agents of
Fascists” were not protected by the First Amendment); supra Part I.C.3. But see Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (holding that an advertisement with
potentially libelous content was protected by the First Amendment because it was a parody).
250. See supra Part I.C; see also supra note 126.
251. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
252. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570 .
253. Id. at 571.
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threats, and it is well established that true threats do not receive First
Amendment protection.254 As Justice Alito succinctly put it, “A fig leaf of
artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful, valueless threats into
protected speech.”255
Rap lyrics and music as a genre may employ more violent language as an
artistic device than other forms of expression.256 In Elonis, one amicus
argued that rap music is not always meant to be taken literally and is often a
means of political expression.257 Such lyrics, despite their violent tone, still
can have First Amendment value; rap music “often serves as an explicit,
even confrontational, vehicle for political commentary and resistance.”258
Even Anthony Elonis’s lyrics had political content, as he challenged the
legitimacy of the PFA and of FBI officers investigating his home.259
But political content does not entitle all violent lyrics to First
Amendment artistic protection; rather, it means that in determining whether
such lyrics constitute a true threat, the court may consider the political
hyperbole idea of Watts more than the fighting words idea of Chaplinsky.
If the words are like the statement in Watts and make a political point
without causing the kind of harm that a true threat causes or otherwise meet
the definition of a true threat, then they are not true threats and are entitled
to First Amendment protection. Therefore, the First Amendment does not
preclude adopting recklessness as the minimum mens rea for conviction
under § 875(c).
Further, as Justice Scalia argued in his dissenting opinion in X-Citement
Video, proscribing harmful material that may be attached to material that
“has artistic or other social value” does not violate the First Amendment.260
In that case, Justice Scalia argued that the minimal or nonexistent First
Amendment value attached to the pornography was clearly outweighed by
the harm to children involved in creating the pornography.261 Similarly, in
cases of recklessly made threats, the First Amendment value is outweighed
by the harmful effects of the threat itself to the victims.262 As in X254. See supra Part I.C.
255. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2017 (2015).
256. Violent and misogynistic lyrics are far from unique to rap. Lyrics in many genres of
music use lyrical hyperbole, and listeners and audience members do not take them literally.
See, e.g., THE BEATLES, Run for Your Life, on RUBBER SOUL (Apple Records 1965) (“I’d
rather see you dead, little girl than to be with another . . . . You better run for your life if you
can, little girl/Hide your head in the sand little girl/Catch you with another man, that’s the
end ah little girl.”); FOSTER THE PEOPLE, Pumped Up Kicks, on FOSTER THE PEOPLE
(Columbia 2011) (“All the other kids with the pumped up kicks/You better . . . outrun my
gun/ . . . You better run . . . faster than my bullet.”); ODESZA, It’s Only (feat. Zyra), on IN
RETURN (Foreign Family Collective 2014) (“Don’t struggle too much now/While I kill you
in your sleep.”); FLORENCE AND THE MACHINE, Kiss with a Fist, on LUNGS (Universal Island
2008).
257. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap
Music Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 6, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983).
258. Id. at 11.
259. See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
260. X-Citement Video v. United States, 513 U.S. 64, 84 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 85.
262. See supra Parts I.B.1, III.A.
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Citement Video, in cases of threats, children can be the victims of the crime,
and failing to convict speakers who make threats recklessly may leave them
underprotected.263
Lastly, the context of the threat—the facts of which determine whether
the threat was made recklessly or with another level of mens rea—matters
to the First Amendment analysis. As Justice Alito argued in his partial
dissent, if Anthony’s Facebook threats were made in a context where the
audience clearly would understand that the lyrics were not meant to be
taken literally, they would not constitute reckless threats, or, by some
definitions, even threats at all.264 In his dissent in Black, Justice Thomas
argued that the violent history of cross burning cannot be separated from
the act of burning a cross itself, and thus the First Amendment does not
preclude imputing intent on to the act of burning a cross.265 Though the
majority did not address it, this principle is convincing and applicable to
threats. Making statements recklessly in some contexts—notably, those
marked by domestic violence or abuse—causes just the same harm as an
intentionally made threat and understandably instills in its victims a wellgrounded fear of physical violence.266
Thus, a speaker is sufficiently protected by the First Amendment even if
a court interprets § 875(c) as allowing conviction of a speaker who made a
threat recklessly.
C. The Impact on Domestic Violence Victims
This Note has argued that courts could interpret § 875(c) to include
recklessness on statutory interpretation grounds and that doing so would not
violate the First Amendment. But should courts adopt this interpretation?
The following section argues that in defining the bounds of the crime, the
courts should protect the victims, particularly the victims of domestic
violence. As courts establish precedent, many applying the subjective
threat analysis for the first time, they will balance values and consider
policy as they did in previous cases in addition to using tools of statutory
construction and examining the First Amendment.267 In particular, courts
should take into account two major policy considerations: (1) the impact
of their interpretation of the statute on victims of domestic violence, and (2)
the parties that will bear the costs of imperfect fact-finding under each
interpretation of the crime, given that the dynamics of an abusive
relationship may impede conviction of those who act in ways Congress
intended to prohibit.
263. See DVLE Br., supra note 21, at 23 (“Often, perpetrators threaten not only the
victim, but also the victim’s children, family, friends, and pets.”).
264. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
265. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388–91 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In our
culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in
its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence.”).
266. DVLE Br., supra note 21, at 24–25 (“[T]hreats often escalate and culminate in acts
of physical violence. . . . Thus, victims’ fear in response to threats [is] well-founded.”).
267. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
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1. The Victims of Threats
Because domestic violence is such a serious problem and interpretation
of this statute will directly affect litigation in this area, courts should
strongly and explicitly weigh the effect of the doctrine on abuse victims
when defining the gray area around recklessness after Elonis.268
Threats are an integral part of the pattern of domestic abuse, scholars and
researchers argue.269 Threats that instill fear in a victim are intended to
confer control over the victim on the abuser.270 Threats are part of a pattern
of abuse, often precede physical violence, and are disturbingly common.271
The Court’s decision in Elonis, shifting from an objective to a subjective
standard, already gave more power to abusers.272 Technology and social
media lower barriers to making a threat.273 These facts render women and
children less protected from perpetrators of domestic abuse. Raising the
minimum mens rea also raises the cost of fact-finding to both the victim and
the government—which further disadvantages victims.
The courts should be especially sensitive to the plight of victims in
§ 875(c) cases because the structure of litigation gives more power to the
defendants. Some scholars argue that the legal system as an institution does
not adequately protect victims of domestic abuse against this harm because
the structure of litigation is not conducive to giving victims adequate
representation.274 Further, the nature of the abuser’s control over the victim
can create a significant barrier to the victim pressing charges.275
Finally, requiring a higher mens rea for conviction under § 875(c) will
translate in some cases to a higher burden on victims in seeking a civil
protection order.276 Civil protection orders are issued in every state and
often turn on the definition of federal crimes.277 The orders are not
punitive, but rather exist to protect potential victims against (further)
crimes.278 In eighteen states, victims seeking these orders must “prove the
268. Burke, supra note 189, at 104 (“Outside the realm of criminal law, social scientists
almost universally describe domestic violence as an ongoing pattern of conduct motivated by
the batterer’s desire for power and control over the victim. In contrast, the criminal statutes
used to prosecute domestic violence almost universally describe discrete acts.”).
269. NNEDV Br., supra note 13, at 7–15.
270. Burke, supra note 189, at 119–20 (“To obtain or maintain control over their intimate
partners, batterers do not limit themselves to physical abuse. They also resort to emotional
abuse that is not itself criminalized and is therefore not considered in a prosecution brought
under a general criminal statute. The violence itself might be relatively minor, but it is used
as part of an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and control that extends to all areas
of a woman’s life, including sexuality; material necessities; relations with family, children,
and friends; and work.” (citations omitted)).
271. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.
272. Soraya Chemaly & Mary Anne Franks, Supreme Court May Have Made Online
Abuse Easier, TIME (June 3, 2015), http://time.com/3903908/supreme-court-elonis-freespeech [https://perma.cc/WY55-X8EH].
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274. DVLE Br., supra note 21, at 30–31.
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277. See id. at 19.
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crime of threats in order to receive a civil protection order based on
threats.”279 A higher mens rea standard would make receiving these prelitigation, nonpunitive protection orders even more difficult for victims of
domestic violence. Further, the timing of issuing these orders is important;
they are “designed to offer flexible remedies, tailored to a victim’s
particular circumstances.”280 They can be issued when “harm seems
imminent.”281 Requiring the victim to prove a more difficult mens rea
impedes this important function of civil protection orders. Thus, an
interpretation of § 875(c) making proving the crime of threats more difficult
may lead to suboptimal protection via civil protection orders.
2. Defining the Crime to Protect the Victim
Fact-finding is costly and imperfect. Congress, knowing that the costs of
fact-finding can fall on the parties unequally and alone can resolve the case,
can nonetheless write criminal statutes in ways that allow those committing
the “evil to be cured” to be convicted.282 As courts interpret the mental
state required for conviction under § 875(c), they should be cognizant that a
higher fact-finding burden could disproportionately fall on victims of
threats both in lawsuits and in earlier nonpunitive proceedings, like civil
protection orders. Courts should be cognizant of this implication as they
select the minimum mens rea and set precedent in this area.
The Court has used policy to interpret statutory crimes throughout its
cases concerning harmful speech, and it should do so again here. In
Sullivan, the Court ratcheted up the burden on a public-figure plaintiff
alleging defamation to protect discourse on issues of public concern.283
Requiring juries to find that the defendant acted with actual malice—a
subjective inquiry—by clear and convincing evidence plus directing courts
of appeals to take on searching reviews of the facts did not change the
substance of the law. Rather, it shifted procedure to protect public
discourse.
Similarly, to achieve the policy goal of encouraging
investigative reporting on dangerous topics like organized crime in Hepps,
the Court shifted the burden of proving the veracity of a defamatory
statement from the defendant to the plaintiff. In cases of threats, it is
appropriate for courts to do the same. Because a minimum mens rea of
recklessness is consistent with the statute and the defendant’s First
Amendment rights, selecting a lower mens rea requirement to make
convicting perpetrators of domestic violence less difficult is an acceptable
solution.
In § 875(c) cases, the court considers not only the procedural burdens as
in Sullivan and Hepps, but also the substance of the law and the “evil to be
cured” that Congress identified in the statute. If the “evil to be cured” that
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Id. at 27.
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See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2(e) (4th ed. 2003).
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§ 875(c) targets is captured using a recklessness standard, the Court should
not require the higher mens rea standard. To hold otherwise would frustrate
the point of criminalizing this behavior when applied to victims of domestic
violence because the threats are uniquely harmful, the threats are often
linked to physical violence, and litigation within those relationships has
different dynamics and different impediments than typical litigation.284 The
backstories to these cases are fundamentally different from those in other
litigation. Courts can and should recognize and address this.
This implication is particularly important in cases of domestic violence
where showing that an abuser acted with knowledge or purpose may be
difficult, expensive, and emotionally charged.285 When the lowest burden
the government must bear is recklessness, victims are better protected
because it is easier to convict an abuser. When the standard is higher,
speakers are more strongly protected. Litigants must expend more
resources to meet that burden, and many are financially unable to do so.286
Thus, the court’s selection of a minimum mens rea is a policy choice as
much as it is a question of statutory interpretation and a normative question
of culpability.
It is true that the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for “breathing
room” for speech so as not to chill speech with high First Amendment
value.287 For this reason, a court may be inclined to interpret the statute to
protect speakers and set knowledge as the minimum mens rea requirement.
But Elonis did set out adequate “breathing room” for speech by holding
that the defendant must have a subjective mental state with respect to the
threatening nature of the communication and that negligence is too low a
standard. Statements that are objectively threats and threats made
negligently cause the same harm as subjectively intended threats, but are
protected under the decision.288 Statements with First Amendment value,
like political hyperbole, still receive First Amendment protection and
protection in the very definition of “true threats.”
Further, as Justice Alito points out, the Court held in Sullivan that “the
law provides adequate breathing space when it requires proof that false

284. See supra Part I.B.3.
285. See generally Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567 (2003).
286. See id. at 593 (arguing that the cost of representation is prohibitive for many litigants
in domestic violence cases that frequently demand substantial attorney time and do not
involve money settlements).
287. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011) (holding that some
outrageous speech must be tolerated to provide adequate protection of freedom of speech in
a political context); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive.”). But see Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) (noting that “our profound national commitment to
the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of
libel carve out an area of breathing space so that protected speech is not discouraged,” but
still applying the heightened actual malice standard).
288. See supra Part III.B.
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statements were made with reckless disregard of their falsity.”289 Just as in
that case where a standard of recklessness was held not to inappropriately
chill speech, here, too, the recklessness standard provides sufficient
protection to speech to satisfy the First Amendment.
Finally, recklessness is not a low standard for the prosecution to prove,
and, if courts adopt it, defendants are still left with significant substantive
and procedural protection. As the MPC defines it, recklessness requires
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that is a “gross
deviation” from the conduct of a reasonable person.290 Thus, by definition,
a threat made recklessly is not an accident or slight overstatement.291 To
meet this standard, the speaker must have acted with significant
wrongdoing. This definition provides a good balance between protecting
the perpetrator from unduly harsh sanctions and protecting the victim from
the legitimate harms this crime causes.
CONCLUSION
Threats jurisprudence, constitutional regulation of speech, and required
mens rea standards have changed significantly in the history of the United
States. Elonis recently further developed the doctrine, but left large holes
that lower courts must now fill using statutory interpretation principles. In
deciding these cases, courts have the authority to, and they should, consider
policy issues. Particularly, courts should examine the practical effect their
rulings will have on domestic abuse victims explicitly and should decide the
issue in a way that protects both the victims and the constitutional rights of
defendants: that one who recklessly makes a threat may be convicted under
§ 875(c).
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